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Abstract: 
This paper focuses on the way PMCs shape security policies and more generally political 
priorities. Linking up with classical thinking about “civil-military relations”, it suggests 
that preoccupation with security professionals’ role in shaping politics is as important 
when these professionals are privately organised in PMCs as it is when they are enrolled 
in public armed forces. The paper shows that existing regulation has not been adjusted to 
account for this fact and that the significance of regulating PMCs’ role in shaping politics 
is profoundly underestimated. It therefore argues that putting the issue of regulating 
“civil-PMCs relations” on the agenda is essential. 
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Chapter 13 — Regulating the Role of PMCs in Shaping 
Security and Politics 
Anna Leander 
Over the past decade the scale and scope of PMC activity have both expanded to a degree few 
believed possible. Charles Moskos for example, writes that “little did I realize when I first proposed 
a quarter century ago that the military was shifting from an institution to an occupation (the I/O 
thesis) that private profit making companies would one day actually do military jobs”.1 This rise of 
PMCs has triggered considerable discussion about regulation (amongst other things). The problem 
is not that PMCs are “unregulated”. As the chapters in this volume testify, PMCs are “regulated” by 
export licensing systems and international human rights law.2 PMCs and their employees can be 
held accountable individually.3 And the armed forces regulate their relations to contractors, as do 
states.4 In fact, industry representatives present during a workshop organized for this volume talked 
about overregulation and considered themselves burdened by multiple, contradictory, and patchy 
rules that are often unclear about which administration is responsible when and for what. 
 One regulatory issue has nonetheless been strangely — and unacceptably — marginal, 
                                                 
1 Moskos, Charles C. Jr., “Introduction” in Jean M. Callaghan and Franz Kernic (eds), Armed Forces and International 
Security: Global Trends and Issues (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2003), p. 6. 
2 Caparini and Doswald-Beck in this volume. 
3 Taylor in this volume. 
4 Isenberg and Lehnardt in this volume. 
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namely the regulation of PMCs’s role in shaping understandings of security and politics. Close to 
nothing has been said or done to adjust existing regulation to the rise of PMCs. Yet, as the first 
section of this chapter shows, this classical regulatory concern is as real when the “specialists on 
violence”5 shaping politics are “private” and work for PMCs, as it is when they are “public” and 
enrolled in the armed forces. While elaborate institutional and sociological regulatory frameworks 
cover the public armed forces’ role in shaping security and politics, or “civil-military relations”, 
nothing equivalent has been developed — or is even being contemplated — to cover the role of 
PMCs in shaping security and politics, or “civil-PMCs relations”. As the second and third sections 
of this chapter show, the institutional regulatory frameworks covering public armed forces generally 
do not apply to PMCs and sociological regulation is largely dysfunctional. The aim here is to argue 
that the “realistic” approach to regulation this book strives to develop needs to encompass also this 
regulatory concern of classical realist thinkers such as Karl von Clausewitz. 
The Relevance of a Classical Realist Concern with the Regulation of PMCs 
In von Clausewitz’s formulation “war is the continuation of politics by other means”. The police 
uses force to impose laws agreed on through a political process. The military defends a national 
interest that is defined politically. In fact, thinking about the use of force as a prolongation of 
                                                 
5 This term is borrowed from Harold Laswell and used because it leaves open the status and organization of security 
professionals while focusing attention on their specific competence. See Harold Laswell, “The Garrison State” 
in Jay Stanley (ed.), Essays on the Garrison State (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997), pp. 55-76 
(originally published in 1941 in the American Journal of Sociology). 
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politics is so profoundly anchored that it is often turned into the defining characteristic of a 
“legitimate” use of force. This is the true not least in the Weberian definition (of the state as the 
institution with a “monopoly on the legitimate use of force”), where the meaning of legitimate is 
left open and derives mainly and tautologically from the fact that force is exercised by the state.6 
There are of course many situations where force is used also by private actors pursuing private 
interests, rather than as “politics by other means” and the legitimacy of the use of force by states is 
often strongly contested.7 However, when states claim to use force legitimately they claim to do so 
as a “continuation of politics” by other means. 
 In these situations the question that arises is: what politics? Whose interests and priorities 
are served and reflected? Who wins and loses? There is no uncontested national interest.8 Different 
groups and individuals in society always have varying and incompatible priorities and some may 
have no preconceived political priorities at all but develop these through the process of deliberating 
with others. Moreover, there is no uncontested understanding of what kind of force (if any) should 
be used to pursue politics by other means. Also here a political process is at the origin of a common 
understanding. What politics a specific use of force is the prolongation of is, in other words, defined 
                                                 
6 R. B J. Walker, “Violence, modernity, silence: from Max Weber to international  relations”, in David Campbell and 
Michael Dillon (eds) The Political Subject of Violence (Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1993), pp. 137-160. 
7 It has been pointed out that this relationship does not always hold in complex emergencies and new wars the 
relationship is arguably inversed: politics is a prolongation of violence by other means. Similarly, force is 
sometimes used (including on a large scale for no well defined reason).  
8 Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 2, no. 3 (1996), pp. 
275-318. 
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in a political process where different views are brought together and – in Arendtian fashion — a 
substantive understanding of the common good (or national interest) and how to best defend it is 
created. This process may encompass a smaller or larger number of voices depending on issues and 
contexts. There is no reason to suppose that everyone has an equal voice or even a voice at all in the 
process. Most US security policy, for example, is made in a political process involving a rather 
narrow set of individuals and institutions. However, it clearly matters whose voice can be heard and 
is allowed to shape this process. 
 When it comes to the use of force — internally or externally — a perennial question has 
been the extent to which the voice of specialists on violence should be heard. The answer is far 
from straightforward. On the one hand, specialists of violence are a necessary part of the discussion. 
The reason is their understanding of the technical aspects of the use of force. The specialists on 
violence knows what can reasonably be obtained by what kind of strategy and at what cost. 
Moreover, in a long term perspective, specialists on violence know what kind of capacities they 
need to be develop to face a threat. These insights have to be taken into account when force is used 
as a continuation of politics. If they are not, decisions may be made to use force for political 
purposes where it has little or no possibility of being effective. This explains the fear that when 
specialists on violence are excluded from political processes, civilians may drift into “military 
adventurism” or abuse security institutions to bolster their authoritarian and repressive regimes.9 
                                                 
9 Eliot Cohen, “Are US Forces Overstreched? Civil-Military Relations” Orbis, vol. 41, no. 2 (1997), pp. 177-186; Kees 
Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, “Military Politics and the Mission of Nation Building”, in Kees Koonings and Dirk 
Kruijt (eds), Political Armies. The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy (London and New 
York: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 9-35; Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States 
(Boulder CO.: Lynne Rienner, 2001). 
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The necessary inclusion of specialists on violence in political processes means that they get a say 
over politics. They become part of making general decisions about how much to prioritize the use 
of force as opposed to other political means and goals. They also become part of specific decisions 
regarding what to do in any given security crisis as well as in defining what constitutes a security 
crisis. 
 The crux is how influential the specialists on violence should be in shaping politics. Even if, 
as just pointed out, their inclusion is essential the flip side of including them is the risk that they 
(and their concerns) may overshadow other actors (and their views). Precisely because they are 
specialists on violence, security professionals may take matters into their own hands, using force in 
the way they consider just and imposing their views on the rest of society. From ancient Athens to 
contemporary Latin America the fear of military regimes has forced policy-makers to find systems 
to control and limit the role of specialists on violence in politics. The current status of democracy as 
the only “legitimate” political system internationally may have alleviated that fear of direct military 
rule. However, it has in no way solved the question of how to limit the role that specialists of 
violence play in politics. 
This is a concern because the world view of specialists of violence is profoundly shaped by 
their professional experience (as is that of any professional category). Their outlook consequently 
privileges security more than would other groups in society, a point well illustrated by General 
Buck Turgidson in Stanley Kubrick’s classic Dr. Strangelove.10 This is particularly true in crisis 
                                                 
10 In the film, a general (Jack the Ripper) decides to launch a nuclear war against the Soviets to find the definite solution 
to the threat posed by fluoride in the water. The bulk of the film focuses on the attempts of the US president to 
stop a nuclear war. General Turgidson is a military adviser whose obsession with security is caricaturised by 
Kubrick. 
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situation where a professional outlook combines with heightened fear and need of vengeance. 
Hence, von Clausewitz insisted that the independent logic of war tends to become absolute and 
must be reined in and controlled not to undermine political aims.11 Since specialists on violence 
retain their professional world views and crises abound, the issue of how to limit the impact of 
professionals of violence on politics is with strongly present. 
 The consequence is that the regulation of the role of specialists on violence in the 
formulation of policies reflects two concerns: one with including and the other with limiting. On the 
one hand, security experts have an important role to play and therefore need to be included in the 
political process defining the common good and how to defend it. On the other hand, their presence 
may stifle or even kill that process and therefore has to be limited. This dual concern applies at least 
as much to PMCs as it does to other specialists of violence. PMCs are security experts. 
Professionalism is crucial to industry self-representation. PMCs sell professional security services 
and they compete on the quality of the services they sell. Moreover, their staff draws on trained 
security professionals often with a background in public security establishments. PMCs constitute a 
category of specialists of violence in their own right. 
 As security professionals it is far from surprising that PMCs are involved in politics. PMCs 
are pulled into the process as they are consulted in all kinds of security related matters. Sometimes, 
this consultancy will concern how to best deal with a given political priority. But PMCs are also 
directly involved in establishing the priorities. They do so for example through their intelligence 
gathering and analysis as well as through their advisory and educational functions; both of which 
make PMCs part of the process defining security concerns and political priorities. The role of CACI 
                                                 
11 Carl von Clausewitz, Geist und Tat. Das Vermächtnis des Soldaten und Denkers. Ein Auswahl aus seinen Werke, 
Briefe und Schriften von Dr. Walther Malmsten Schering.(Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1942), p. 89. 
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and Titan in the interrogations at Abu Ghraib has come to epitomize the role of PMCs in one form 
of intelligence gathering. But the firms also provide intelligence through more sophisticated 
channels. Moreover, military doctrine and strategy is increasingly developed by and spread through 
private firms. “We make American military doctrine” the head of MPRI boasted with some 
justification.12 PMCs run military training, seminars and educational programmes both in the US 
and abroad. Finally, PMCs and their lobby organizations are increasingly consulted on general 
policy issues. The industry has e.g. been invited to hearings in Congress on the development of 
peacekeeping and the development of the situation in Iraq.13 PMCs are pulled into politics. They are 
invited, as specialists, to take part in a variety of discussions of policies. As private specialists on 
violence they are filling functions similar to those filled by their public counterparts. 
 More than this, PMCs may actively — on their own initiative and without invitation — seek 
to influence politics in ways which heighten the regulatory concern. The reason PMCs do this is 
that their business depends on what happens to political priorities. How a problem is understood 
and what kind of solution is found for dealing with it, determines whether or not there will be a 
contract. PMCs therefore have to lobby both for an understanding of problems as security problems 
primarily and for the specific solution they have to offer. “The leading defence company of the 
future will be primarily a manipulator of opinions […] Their key asset is the ability to influence the 
                                                 
12 Ed Soyster quoted in The Economist, 8 July 1999. 
13 See e.g. Doug Brooks’ testimony to the House Committee on International Relations regarding “The Challenges of 
African Peace Keeping”, 2004 (available at wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/bro100804.htm ) and 
Alan Chvotkin’s testimony to the House Committee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 
Relations regarding “Private Security Firms: Standards, Coordination and Cooperation” (available at 
reform.house.gov/NSETIR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=45343 ). 
 8
ways in which prospective buyers (governments and armed services) imagine the wars of the 
future”.14 It is not surprising to find the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) 
promoting a petition demanding military intervention in Darfur or publishing a special issue of its 
review on Sudan.15 Both promoted a general understanding of political priorities in Darfur; rather 
than a well defined role of PMCs. The need to shape broad political views explains the close links 
between political establishments and PMCs. Persons from the political and military establishment 
figure prominently on PMC boards. PMCs also figure prominently on the agenda of many 
policymakers, in some cases too prominently. This is true not only in the US — where Vice 
President Dick Cheney’s ties to the industry (Halliburton in particular) exemplify the controversy 
surrounding links — but also elsewhere, including in Belgium, France, Germany, South Africa and 
Sweden.16
                                                 
14 John Lovering, “Loose Cannons: Creating the Arms Industry of the Twenty-first Century”, in Mary Kaldor (ed.), 
Global Insecurity (London: Pinter, 2000), p. 174 
15 International Peace Operations Association is a lobby organization for PMCs. In 2006 it published a Special issue on 
Sudan of its Journal of International Peace Operations vol. 2 no. 1. For a more detailed analysis see Anna 
Leander and Rens van Munster, “Private Security Contractors in Darfur: Reflecting and Reinforcing Neo-
Liberal Governmentality” International Relations, (2006 forthcoming). 
16 In Belgium a series of scandals have linked high ranking politicians including former NATO secretary general Willy 
Claes to military contractors see e.g. Craig R. Whitney, “Belgium Convicts 12 for Corruption on Military 
Contracts” New York Times (24 December 1998). In France, the “Elf-Affaire” one of France’s biggest 
corruption scandals ever, involved a range of military contractors (see Eva Joly avec la contribution de Laurent 
Beccaria, Est-ce dans ce monde-là que nous voulons vivre? (Paris: Editions des Arènes, 2003)). Two of 
Germany’s biggest corruption scandals (the “Flick Scandal” of the 1980s and the CDU party finance Scandal 
of the late 1990s) both involved arms contractors and senior politicians; see Britta Bannenberg and Wolfgang 
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 In clear, the classical concerns that historically produced the existing regulation of the role 
the (public) military can play in politics pertain also when PMCs are considered. They are pulled 
into politics as experts and this in turn opens the question of how their influence can be limited. In 
chapter eleven, James Cockayne even asks whether PMCs do not at times cease to be agents of a 
principal and become agents in their own right. Since this is neither secret nor news, one might have 
expected the rise of PMCs to trigger a revisiting also of civil-military regulation or more 
appropriately of the regulation covering the role of “specialists on violence” in shaping political 
priorities. However, as the two subsequent sections will show, this has not happened. Whether 
regulation is narrowly thought of as an institutional set up or conceived in broad sociological terms 
as resting mainly on the manipulation of institutional culture, existing forms of regulation have little 
impact on PMCs and there is little sign of efforts directed at altering this state of affairs.  
The Underdeveloped Institutional Regulation of PMCs’ Role in Politics 
A first way of conceiving the regulation of the role of specialists on violence in politics is in terms 
of an institutional regulatory framework set up for that purpose. There is a well established tradition 
                                                                                                                                                                  
J. Schaupensteiner, Korruption in Deutschland. Portrait einer Wachstumsbranch .(Munich: Beck, 2004). In 
South Africa, a string of scandals have tied ANC politicians to arms producers/exporters including the 2001 
scandal involving the European Aeronautical Defense and Space Company (see e.g.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1266950.stm ). In Sweden the links between Bofors and the Swedish 
government have often been contested and some speculate in links between these ties and Palme’s 
assassination. The firm is also known for its alleged involvement in bribing Indian officals (e.g. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bofors ). 
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for regulating the role of specialists on violence. However, this regulation is largely inapplicable to 
PMCs because it assumes that the relevant specialists on violence are members of public armed 
forces. But even if PMCs were to be covered by existing regulation, it would fail to make a dent 
since — by and large — it misses its target. PMCs engage in politics by other channels than public 
armed forces and they increasingly do so in forums other than the classical Clausewitzean one.  
 An institutional regulatory framework is no doubt what most observers associate with the 
regulation of civil-military relations, in the sense of the role of specialists on violence in shaping 
politics. It certainly is the notion of regulation that is promoted by most international institutions 
concerned with the reform of military establishments and security sectors such as the Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control over Armed Forces (DECAF). The most common underlying 
rationale is that there are two partly contradictory “imperatives” in society: a functional military one 
imposed by the needs of an efficient defence and a societal one imposed by the values, institutions 
and ideologies of a society as Huntington formulated it.17 Both imperatives are important but they 
are often incompatible. They therefore have to be protected and insulated from each other and their 
interaction controlled to reduce the risk of one sphere impinging on the other. The resulting 
regulation is one where strict settings, rules and procedures serve to delimit the respective roles of 
military and civilian institutions and channel their interaction. The overall concern is to ensure that 
the military has primacy in ruling itself — that it enjoys professional autonomy and independent 
leadership — and inversely that civilians rule society and politics.18
                                                 
17 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). 
18 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military. The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore and London: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1999). 
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 There is substantial disagreement about how these institutions should look as well as strong 
contextual variation in the form regulatory institutions and practices actually take. However, some 
aspects of this regulatory set up recur. The first is an effort to channel and effectively de-limit the 
context in which security professionals can take part in political debates. Most countries have well 
defined institutional arenas where the armed forces can be consulted and asked to express their 
views. It is characteristic that these tend to be concentrated with the executive branch of 
government, which is also more often than not given primacy in deciding on the use of force. 
Contact between the military and the legislative bodies (e.g. the armed forces and Congress) tends 
to be both less frequent and designed to allow one way questioning (e.g. Congressional hearings) 
rather than to give security professionals the opportunity to participate in the formation of political 
priorities. The participation of specialists on violence in other words tends to be conceived in 
strictly and well defined consultative terms. 
 Second, contributing to restricting the role of specialists on violence in politics are the 
formal and informal restraints imposed by the armed forces on the public conduct of their members. 
Most armed forces have their own formal rules for when and how any of their members may take a 
public stance and discuss political matters. Military hierarchy typically places strict limits on who 
within the armed forces can even imagine taking part in a public discussion, particularly if doing so 
entails questioning the positions of those higher in the hierarchy. But even more significant are the 
informal norms that regulate behaviour. Unwritten rules about acceptable behaviour place severe 
constraints even on those at the top. When, before becoming secretary of state, General Colin 
Powell wrote opinion pieces in the New York Times and gave interviews on issues such as whether 
the West should intervene militarily in Bosnia, he was perceived as violating an unwritten code of 
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conduct.19
 A final recurring aspect of the regulation of the role of specialists of violence in politics is 
that it tends to be marked by a distance to broad (democratic) and political debates. The fact that the 
institutional regulation of security professionals’ role in politics places them in a mainly 
consultative role, focussed on the executive also keeps them at arms length from general public 
debate. The term “democratic deficit” is consequently one that appears with frequency in 
discussions about the political processes surrounding the use of force. Parliaments and publics have 
little insight and correspondingly limited possibilities to hold decision makers and security 
professionals accountable for their decisions and acts. The rapid growth in multi-lateral operations 
accentuates (or “doubles”20) the democratic deficit. By making international institutions, other 
governments, and military alliances central they move parliaments and publics even further away 
from the discussions of policies.  
 This institutional set up with its double democratic deficit is ill-suited to address the 
challenge of regulating the role of PMCs. Most of it is simply not applicable to PMCs at all. The 
basic assumption in the bulk of existing regulation is that the security professionals whose influence 
on politics requires regulation belong to the public armed forces or are indirectly controlled through 
the public armed forces. This assumption makes historical sense in view of the progressive 
nationalization of most functions in the armed forces in the twentieth century.21 However, it is not 
                                                 
19 Desch, Civilian Control, p. 29. 
20 Hans Born and Heiner Hänggi, eds. The 'Double Democratic Deficit'. Geneva: (Ashgate / The Geneva Centre for 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF), 2004. 
21 Anna Leander, Eroding State Authority? Private Military Companies and the Legitimate Use of Force (Rome: Centro 
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adequate in a situation where PMCs have taken over many tasks conventionally defined as military, 
including tasks where the companies act independently of the armed forces.22 Contracts for training, 
logistics, institutional reform, intelligence, and consultancies often directly involve the firms 
establishing policy priorities. Yet, guidelines regulating this role are inexistent because PMCs are 
not the public armed forces.  
When it is decided that no less than half of the financial resources earmarked for post-
conflict reconstruction in Liberia should go to DynCorp for training 2,000 soldiers, no institutional 
mechanism has regulated the role of DynCorp in making this project a priority as compared with 
demobilization, judicial reform, education, healthcare, infrastructure repair, or civil society 
development.23 There has been no clear institutional arena for the discussion between the public 
administration and DynCorp, there are no institutional restraints from without the company limiting 
its participation in discussions and probably even fewer institutional restraints from within. One 
would expect the company to organize the promotion of this specific project and encourage 
employees to use the full variety of channels available to them to do so. On this issue, as on so 
many others, the rules establishing the form and forums for consulting the specialists on violence 
are not applicable because the specialist is not a member of the public armed forces and hence is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Militare di Studi Strategici, 2006). 
22 For the discussion of this Major Michael E. Guillory, “Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the 
Rubicon?” The Air Force Law Review, vol. 51 (2001), pp. 111-150. Major Lisa L. Turner and Major Lynn G. 
Norton, “Civilians at the Tip of the Spear” The Air Force Law Review, vol. 51 (2001), pp. 1-45; Lieutenant 
Junior Grade David A. Melson, “Military Jurisdiction over Civilian Contractors: A Historical Overview” 
Naval Law Review, vol. 52 (2005), pp. 277-320. 
23 Francis W. Nyepon, “Liberia: Engaging U.S. Foreign Policy for Development” All Africa, 29 January 2006. 
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covered neither by the norms and rules pertaining inside the forces nor by those imposed on the 
armed forces from without.  
 Not only are existing rules mostly inapplicable. More seriously even if they were reformed 
and extended to cover also PMCs, they would miss their target and consequently be largely 
ineffective. One reason for this is that existing regulation is aimed at channels and forms of 
influence that are largely irrelevant to PMCs. Even if most of the staff of PMCs is trained in the 
public armed forces, even if the market for military services is profoundly shaped by public 
policies, and even if governments and public institutions remain key buyers of PMC services, 
PMCs are, as they adamantly insist, private companies. This alters their relationship to politics and 
to the formation of political priorities rather substantially. Like other private firms, PMCs treat 
lobbying and advertisement as a normal and accepted business strategy and naturally promote their 
views with administrators, policymakers, and the public at large. It is not surprising to find Chris 
Taylor (of Blackwater) giving speeches in various contexts arguing that Blackwater could offer a 
more efficient alternative to AU or UN peacekeeping and therefore should be sent to Darfur.24 The 
PMCs’ private sector approach to politics makes most existing institutional regulation miss the key 
channels by which PMCs take part in policy-making. PMC influence on the process is more likely 
to be affected by general rules regarding lobbying and public debate than by the regulation of 
specialists on violence in the politics. The question is whether this is enough. 
 A further reason why the regulation of specialists on violence in politics is likely to remain 
ineffective (even if extended to PMCs) is that it addresses the wrong arena of politics. Much of the 
contemporary politics surrounding the use of armed force does not takes place in the traditional 
                                                 
24 Remarks by Chris Taylor, Vice President for Strategic Initiatives at Blackwater USA, at George Washington 
University 28 January (available at www.blackwaterusa.com/btw2005/articles/042805taylor.html ). 
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Clausewitzean arena involving the home state, the people and armed forces as the key actors. 
Rather, military operations are internationalised, involving other governments, military alliances 
and international institutions. This development moves politics beyond conventional state 
boundaries and creates new regulatory challenges for public armed forces (including the “double 
democratic deficit” mentioned above).  
More than this, existing rules work on the assumption that specialists on violence work 
under the auspices of their home state. This does not hold for PMCs. They can and do work outside 
the control of their state and for non-state actors in ways that public armed forces rarely do. They 
work internationally for a variety of public actors on their own initiative and hence push for shifts in 
the political priorities both in the places where they work and at home in relation to these places. 
Public armed forces sometimes pursue politics of their own and shift national priorities. For 
example, during the second Cold War part of the Swedish Armed Forces acted on their own 
initiative and outside of parliamentary control to consolidate collaboration with NATO and make 
defence against the threat from the Warsaw Pact a key political priority.25 However, this kind of 
independent behaviour on behalf of public armed forces is a serious breach of norms and certainly 
not openly practiced as a rule. With PMCs matters are different. PMCs sell their services on a 
market to a variety of buyers with whom their home state may or may not have a military alliance. 
This independence is sometimes a sham as governments use PMCs to circumvent policy restrictions 
and plausibly deny responsibility.26 But often the industry is competing in international markets, 
                                                 
25 Ola Tunander, Hårsfjärden - Det hemliga ubåtskriget mot Sverige.(Stockholm: Stockholm: Norstedts, 2001). 
26 Krahman in this volume. 
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and is treated as if it were, by its home government.27  
Consequently firms may lobby for contracts within the frame of UN or the AU peace 
keeping operations directly with these institutions and on their own initiative. They work for foreign 
governments independently of whether or not their home government has initiated this 
collaboration. Some PMCs, such as MPRI, underline that they will only accept contracts acceptable 
to their home state, but then what is acceptable can be influenced by the firm.28 Other firms, such as 
Blackwater, simply vow to work only for “legitimate” clients, leaving the definition of legitimate 
conveniently open. The point is that the firms do work independently of their home governments. 
This shifts the location of the establishment of political priorities to places, channels and issues not 
covered by existing institutional rules. 
 Finally, it is not only the location of politics that is changing but also the actors involved. 
Private contractors work not only for public actors — such as states, military alliances, and 
international organizations — but also for private actors, including NGOs, individuals, and other 
firms. These contracts mostly fall into the category of “security” contracts and, since they are made 
with non-state actors, they are often assumed to have little relevance for politics and to be less 
contentious. But this assumption is not warranted. For example, guaranteeing the security of a firm 
or an NGO in a war zone often amounts to taking sides in the conflict. It secures resources for one 
side and stops the advance of the other. This explains the Darfur rebels’ demand that all oil 
                                                 
27 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation. (London: available at 
www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/mercenaries,0.pdf, 2002). 
28 As when MPRI lobbied to be allowed to take on a contract upgrading Equatorial Guinea’s coastal guard. Peter W. 
Singer, Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.(Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), p. 196. 
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extraction should be halted in Sudan until the end of the conflict.29 Moreover, when actors with 
opposing interests in a conflict hire security firms, the effect may be to prolong or aggravate the 
conflict.30 This is the reason Abdel-Fatau Musah worries that “the return of proxy wars could 
become a nightmarish reality where well-equipped foreign private forces are allowed to continue 
propping up opposing parties in today's conflicts.”31 Lastly, security provision to non-state clients is 
sometimes intended to alter political conditions as illustrated by the ill-fated coup in Equatorial 
Guinea.32 The blurred distinction between security and military services in many contemporary 
conflict situations33 means that the institutional regulation covering the role of specialists in 
violence in public debate would have to be substantially revised. It would have to be adjusted to 
politics involving, not only foreign governments and international institutions, but also private firms 
and NGOs. In clear, existing rules are all the more likely to miss their target as PMCs work with 
actors that (just like the firms themselves) are not covered by existing regulation. 
 The institutional framework covering the role of specialists on violence in security policies 
                                                 
29 Sylvain Besson,  Malgré les tueries, une firme basée à Genève prospecte au Darfour   Le Temps, 25 August 2005. 
30 UN, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (S/2001/357) (New York: UN Security Council, 2001). 
31 Adel-Fatau Musah, “Privatization of Security: Arms Proliferation and the Process of State Collapse in Africa” 
Development and Change, vol. 33, no. 5 (2002), p. 928. 
32 BBC, “The Men Behind the 'Guinean Plot'”, BBC Online News, 13 March 2004. 
33 Often it matters more for the difference in connotations than for differences in substance. At the meeting preparing 
the publication of this book, an representative from a private firm argued that there were no Private Military 
Companies (since the closing down of EO); only Private Security Companies. 
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is, to say the least, underdeveloped when it comes to regulating the role of PMCs in shaping 
security and politics. The existing framework is designed to cover public actors exclusively. But 
more seriously it is ill-suited to cover the key forms of PMC participation in politics as well as the 
key arenas where this politics is taking place. Arguably, the problem is a longstanding one. In 1961 
the U.S. President Eisenhower focussed his farewell speech on it. He pointed out that “in the 
councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether 
sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of 
misplaced power exists and will persist”.34 However, that a problem is old does not mean that 
solutions are available. In this case finding solutions is not even on the agenda. Little effort has so 
far gone into updating the -- mostly inapplicable but also outdated and therefore ineffective -- rules 
covering the role of security specialists in politics to the emergence of PMCs.  
A Dysfunctional Sociological Regulation of PMCs Participation in Politics 
Institutional regulation is not the only way of shaping and controlling the presence of specialists on 
violence in politics. There is a sociological alternative. Instead of assuming that what is needed is a 
separation of spheres regulated by institutions, this alternative tradition argues for what Morris 
Janowitz termed a “compatibility of values” between the military and society. A common political 
culture is the guarantee that security professionals will be present in politics without dominating it. 
As institutional regulation, this kind of “regulation” exists in most countries. However, not only is it 
                                                 
34 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address (Available at www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/farewell.htm). 
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ineffective when it comes to dealing with PMC, it is dysfunctional. The direction of regulation is 
reversed. PMCs seem to have more impact on public debates and values — including those in the 
public armed forces — than these have on the PMCs. 
 The sociological tradition departs from the view that, ultimately, formal regulation and 
institutional rules are less important than is the “compatibility” of the culture in society and large 
and in the military. Formal regulation can never guarantee that the role of security professionals is 
positive. Only a basic shared world view can. The idea of a “constabulary force” is a classical 
illustration of this line of thinking. The general idea is that the armed forces would be capable of 
evolving with society and adjusting to it: the “military establishment is continuously prepared to 
act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than 
victory, because it has incorporated a protective military purpose.”35 This requires strong ties 
between the military and the civilian worlds. The sociological tradition does not suggest blurring 
the distinction between military and civilian society nor does it deny the Huntingtonian functional 
and societal imperatives.36 However, instead, of focusing on institutional rules of interaction, the 
sociological tradition highlights organizational structures, values and identities in the military.37 It 
                                                 
35 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait.(New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 148 and 
Morris Janowitz, “Toward a Redefition of Military Strategy in International Relations” World Politics, vol. 26, 
no. 4  (1974), pp. 473-508. 
36  On the contrary, Janowitz underlined that blurring the lines might undermine military functionality and lead to “new 
forms of militarism” in society. See Morris Janowitz, “Military Elites and the Study of War” Conflict 
Resolution, vol. 1, no. 1 (1957), p.18. 
37 Morris Janowitz, “Changing Patterns of Organizational Authority: The Military Establishment” Administrative 
Science Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 4 (1959), pp. 473-493. 
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focuses on what is said and done rather than the institutional channels and forums where it is said 
and done. 
 The sociological perspective on PMCs’ role in politics, consequently, focuses on whether 
recruitment, training, advancement, hierarchies, and identities in the military produce values 
compatible with those in society or, alternatively, on how they could be reshaped to do so. As with 
institutional regulation, the aims, forms, and praxis of sociological regulation have varied 
considerably. Countries differ in their understanding of their armed forces and their role not only in 
public debate but also in society.38 Integrating minorities, homosexuals, or women into the armed 
forces is both a way of ensuring that the armed forces reflect society and a road for these groups to 
claim full citizenship.39 Moreover, armed forces also have varying institutional cultures and pasts. 
Consequently, the issues and forms of sociological regulation vary considerably. In Germany, the 
1933-1945 legacy has created a military culture where individual responsibility and the limits of 
authority are essential which has no equivalence in France. Inversely, in France the focus on 
representation and on the integration of the “beurs” [French citizens of Maghrebi origin] has no 
equivalent in Germany. It is hence neither surprising that states regulate the links between armed 
forces and society sociologically, nor that they do so in highly diverging ways. The question is how 
this “sociological regulation” works with regard to PMCs. Allowing for wide contextual variation, 
the answer is unsettling. 
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 To some extent PMCs are affected by public attempts to socially regulate specialists on 
violence. States shape PMC culture and behaviour from the outside for example by establishing 
compulsory vetting procedures, by restricting acceptable activities and by buying services only 
from firms that behave according to specified standards. In addition to this, public armed forces 
may influence PMCs through the close links between these institutions: PMCs may incorporate the 
organizational culture, values, and priorities of the public armed forces. These indirect processes 
may be reinforced by states treating PMCs as legitimate actors, inducing them to act as if they were. 
These mechanisms taken together could make existing sociological regulation (in a slightly updated 
and adjusted version) a good basis for regulating PMCs. In fact, PMCs could become a vehicle for 
socializing a variety of specialists on violence into a (publicly sanctioned) professional military 
culture. They could “draw more actors into the prevailing system of social norms”.40 However, 
there is little evidence that this is what is currently going on. 
 Rather PMCs see to be developing a variety of corporate cultures and value systems 
independently of each other but also largely outside the influence of public institutions (armed 
forces and states). Consider, for example, the impact public institutions may have on the values in 
PMCs through their influence on recruitment. The firms first and foremost recruit staff according to 
their own preferences and needs. Many PMCs recruit globally. As a consequence no government is 
likely to know the details of the staff recruited. Moreover, since many PMC employees have 
worked in a variety of countries and conflicts, it is difficult to imagine that black-lists held by any 
one actor would be helpful. Vetting procedures as well as self-regulatory blacklists aimed at 
                                                 
40 Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), p. 49. 
 22
controlling recruitment depend on the reporting of a wide range of actors.41 Finally, only a limited 
numbers of firms would be likely to abide by procedures and report to blacklists in the first place. 
Even fewer would be likely to do so for all kinds of contracts. Finally, only a limited numbers of 
firms would be likely to abide by procedures and report to blacklists in the first place. Even fewer 
would be likely to do so for all kinds of contracts. Vetting procedures, blacklists and the like are 
therefore likely to be of circumscribed effectiveness at best. The more realistic scenario is that 
PMCs continue recruiting according to patterns over which governments and armed forces have 
little say. The example of recruitment illustrates a more general point: namely that there is little 
possibility for the public to shape the corporate culture developing in PMCs. Even if most 
established firms adhere to codes of conduct,42 they do this if, when, and as they decide to.  
More fundamentally, it is not clear that PMCs’ organizational culture is converging with the 
professional culture of public armed forces, promoted by states. This observation concerns not only 
marginal firms, but also large respected ones as starkly illustrated by the Aegis “trophy video” 
posted on the internet.43 Obviously, similar videos could have been posted by members of the 
public armed forces. The difference is that in the public armed forces there is an institutional culture 
of sanctioning this kind of behaviour. There are mechanisms not only to reprimand such 
occurrences, but also for detecting them and preventing non-accepted sub-cultures to develop. It is 
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far from clear that PMCs (including large ones such as Aegis) have anything equivalent to this nor 
is it clear that any attempts are made to impose it on the firms. It therefore seems far more likely 
that PMCs will continue to develop their own (diverse) subcultures than that they will draw a 
variety of security professionals into a publicly sanctioned professional culture.  
 This seems all the more unlikely since, at present “sociological regulation” seems to be 
working at least partly in “reverse”. Rather than making values in the military compatible with the 
values in civil society, the rise of PMCs seems to have the effect of making values in civil society 
compatible with those of the military or more correctly with those of the PMCs. PMCs work in 
competitive markets. They compete for contracts and market shares. This competition requires 
marketing products and creating demand. There is no need for conspiracies or immorality to explain 
PMCs’ struggle to shape understandings of politics. The context in which they do so is one where 
private business and market solutions generally have a positive connotation.  
There are indications that this is resulting in an increasing acceptance of PMCs and their 
worldviews in a variety of social spheres.44 For example, in development thinking and actual 
development programmes, security holds an increasingly central position and PMCs services are 
valued. Public and private aid agencies hire PMCs for security. They also rely on PMCs and former 
PMC employees for tasks that that are not directly security related such as monitoring human rights 
or implementing non-security related development projects.45 Perhaps most surprisingly, PMCs 
seem to be fashionable, quite literally, as Paris fashion stores carry Blackwater gear and the Internet 
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is buzzing with sites, blogs, and lists relating to PMCs.46  
 It would be an exaggeration to claim that PMCs have gained general authority over security 
matters. However, the prospect that the values of PMCs permeate society raises Harold Laswell’s 
concern that we may be “moving toward a world of ‘garrison states’ — a world in which the 
specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society”.47 The worry in this world is not that 
specialists on violence take matters into their own hands. Rather, it is that their world view and 
understanding of problems becomes so dominant and so widely accepted that others take it for 
granted. The political costs of such developments are high. It limits the scope for thinking through 
options for international diplomacy and politics. But it also reflects inwards and limits national 
freedom and the scope for politics.48 The costs are potentially so enormous that, at the height of the 
Cold War, Laswell found it “inadequate to say that the dominant crisis of our time is socialism 
versus capitalism. More correctly, it is socialism and capitalism versus the garrison-prison state”.49  
 The “sociological regulation” of PMCs’ role in politics is, to sum up, ineffective at best but 
more probably dysfunctional. It is ineffective because PMCs’ organizational culture largely escapes 
control and manipulation not from only of the civilian public authorities but more generally also 
from public armed forces. Sociological regulation may even be working in reverse as the private 
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actors are increasingly prone to shape worldviews and values both in the (public) military, in the 
state and in society at large. PMCs may hence socialize actors into an existing system of norms, but 
there is little empirical or theoretical evidence that it would be the system of the professional public 
forces. It seems more likely to be the highly varying system of norms prevailing in the PMCs and 
the market for force which is a substantially different thing. More strongly, the section has made the 
point that the sociological regulation may be dysfunctional since the dynamics of the market for 
force tends to reverse sociological regulation: societal and political values are made compatible 
with those of specialists on violence; not the other way around.  
Conclusion 
In their introduction to this volume, the editors of this book make the valid assessment that the 
“abolitionist” stance on regulating PMCs is increasingly rare. They draw the pragmatic conclusion 
that what is needed is a “realistic approach to regulation”. This chapter showed that a central aspect 
of regulation in the “realist” approach: namely the regulation of the role of specialists of violence in 
politics, has remained marginal in the discussions surrounding PMCs. This is not because it is 
unimportant or irrelevant. On the contrary, the political processes establishing for what purpose 
what kind of force is used are fundamental and PMCs do take part in them and do shape them. Yet, 
the present context is not only one where the abolitionist stance on regulation has disappeared. It is 
also one where PMCs are increasingly present as a new cast of efficient, competent, and apolitical 
security experts. In this context, the concern with regulating the way PMCs (as specialists on 
violence) shape politics is readily swept aside and forgotten.  
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This chapter has argued against this neglect but it has not proposed a blueprint for action for 
the simple reason that there can be no general blueprint. Views on the role of specialist of violence 
in politics differ as profoundly as do the institutional context and history of civil-military relations. 
Moreover, the multiplicity of arenas, actors and issues defy simple common blueprint solutions. No 
one blueprint could possibly inform regulation of the role PMCs play in political processes as 
diverse as those surrounding a UN intervention, Liberian reconstruction, the US presence in Iraq, 
and the Chinese oil company Clivden’s operations in Sudan. This said, even if there can be no 
general blue, the elaboration of viable contextual regulation remains of essence. 
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